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This article extends the characteristics-based choice framework of technology adoption to 
account for decisions taken by boundedly-rational individuals in environments where traits are 
not fully observed. It is applied to an agricultural setting and introduces the concept of ambiguity 
in the agricultural technology adoption literature by relaxing strict informational and cognition 
related assumptions that are implied by traditional Bayesian analysis. The main results confirm 
that ambiguity increases as local conditions become less homogeneous and as computational 
ability, own experience and nearby adoption rates decrease. Measurement biases associated with 
full rationality assumptions are found to increase when decision makers have low computational 
ability, low experience and when their farming conditions differ widely from average adopter 
ones. A complementary empirical paper (Useche 2006) finds that models assuming low 
confidence in observed data, ambiguity and pessimistic expectations about traits predict sample 
shares better than models which assume that farmers do not face ambiguity or are optimistic 
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Technology Adoption in Poorly Specified 
Environments   
1. Introduction   
The analysis of agricultural technology adoption decisions has typically relied on models where 
agents are assumed to be fully rational.
1 These models depict decision-makers similar to the ones 
described by Debreu (1959), “who have a complete plan of action made now for the whole 
future”, over completely specified (physically, temporally, and spatially) commodities. In these 
models, all relevant information necessary to make an adoption (or non-adoption) decision is 
available to the decision maker at no cost, he has perfect cognition and forms expectations taking 
all available information into account, without making any systematic errors when predicting the 
future.  
In the 1950’s Herbert Simon (1955, 1959) called the attention of the economics 
profession to the need to introduce limits on human knowledge and computational ability into 
their models of rationality. However, mainstream technology adoption theory in economics has 
not yet been significantly affected by this call. The likely reason why this has not happened is 
that theories based on full rationality, even though unrealistic in many settings, provide a 
complete picture of behavior under uncertainty -- commodities can be contingent on future 
events (McFadden 1999, p. 6). Since uncertainty is a quintessential feature of innovation 
processes --and even more so in agricultural settings— researchers seeking to explain adoption 
of agricultural innovations find this framework attractive because it allows for the resolution of 
uncertainty through complex patterns of experience and learning.  
  However, it is precisely in agricultural settings with rapid technological innovation where 
the rational framework might be less realistic and where learning might not completely resolve 
uncertainty. First of all, many agricultural technologies have traits that interact with the 
ecosystem and with other technologies, changing across space and over time. Thus, agricultural 
technological alternatives might not be completely specfied in Debreu’s sense, at a moment in 
time. Second, information in agricultural settings tends to be less perfect and more costly than in 
                                                 
1 See for example Feder and O’Mara 1981, 1982; Besley and Case 1993; 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; 
Cameron 1999; Isik and Khanna 2003; Munshi 2004 2 
 
typical consumer demand scenarios (Experimentation and information gathering are more costly 
than with standard consumer goods precisely because of the interactions between the traits of 
agricultural technologies with other factors that often are unobservable). Third, important 
determinants of technological outcomes or the outcomes themselves might be unobservable or 
only partially observable (both to farmers and to the researcher).
2  And fourth, lower education 
levels in rural areas and lower availability of computational devices might translate into lower 
ability to process information and perform complicated cognitive operations. For example, 
Munshi (2004) notes that available information sometimes appears to be persistently ignored by 
individuals or communities. 
  Furthermore, the rational framework is more consistent with a laboratory type situation 
where the decision-maker perceives the environmental conditions to be identical or replicable 
than with a changing environment like the agricultural one. In the standard rational setting, the 
uncertainty faced by decision makers is regarded as arising from known iid stochasticity in key 
outcomes rather than arising out of systematic unobservability or biases in the observability of 
these outcomes. That is, though expectations may turn out incorrect, the deviations will not 
depart systematically from the expected values observed by the researcher on a random sample 
of the population. This helps resolve uncertainty and, together with the assumption that key 
outcome distributions are stationary over time, helps agents learn about true distribution 
parameters and completely resolve uncertainty. After many trials, the decision-maker “will 
naturally become confident that an observed empirical frequency (of e.g. positive results) is close 
to a “true” frequency (of positive outcomes), that can be used for forecasting future trials … That 
is, he will eventually become confident enough to view the data as an i.i.d. process” (Eppstein 
and Schneider (2006), p.3).  
In this article, I seek to develop tools to understand the choices made by agents with 
imperfect information about choice traits, with limited cognitive ability for information storing 
and processing, and who have to make decisions in an uncertain, vaguely specified or poorly 
understood environment. Contrary to the common view that models of microeconomic behavior 
                                                 
2 Unobservability or partial observability of outcome distributions occur when it is impossible to infer the 
distribution parameters even from an infinite number of observations (Manski 1995). As an example, late adopters 
of an agricultural technology might observe the outcomes obtained by early adopters, but might never be able to 
infer the true distribution of outcomes that is representative for a farm randomly drawn of the population. If the 
farming conditions of early adopters are fundamentally different from the conditions of late adopters (and the 
differences in farming conditions are determined by heterogeneous unobserved factors), regardless of how many 
trials are analyzed neither the researcher nor the farmer can know the full distribution (or infer it).  3 
 
with bounded rationality are less rich and deep than those achieved by standard models assuming 
full rationality, 
3 my view is that substantive rationality is actually a model constraint in this type 
of scenario.  I apply my research to the choice of adoption of genetically modified crop varieties 
by farmers. In an effort to understand how expectations about technological traits (such as 
profitability or management intensity) determine agricultural technological choices, most authors 
have portrayed farmers as subjects learning through a Bayesian belief-updating mechanism. 
However, the rationality constraints on adoption behavior actually implied in the application of 
this mechanism are left tacit and have not been explicitly analyzed. In this work I specify a 
generalized framework of the technology adoption problem under uncertainty and analyze these 
constraints.   
One main aspect of constrained rationality analyzed in this study relates to the question of 
what agents can know about technological traits in complicated environments --where important 
relevant factors are unobserved, which affect outcomes and information disseminated about 
them, and where these factors vary over time in ways that are not well understood by decision 
makers--. Standard rational frameworks have modeled decision-makers as being overconfident 
and ambitious about what they can know (Epstein and Schneider (2006). This is especially the 
case in situations where agents have no reason to believe that trial conditions can be replicable, 
where several potential outcomes seem possible (Shackle 1955), or when agents are not able to 
or are not confident enough about being able to measure uncertainty (Knight 1921). In all of 
these cases, decision-makers might make choices under ambiguity. That is, when their choice 
problem is not completely or uniquely defined (Ellsberg 1961; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; 
Epstein and Schneider 2003; Epstein and Wang 2004). My view is that the lack of consideration 
of the type of environment –simple or complicated-- in which innovations are to be adopted has 
not only lead to misspecification of the problem but to confounding the role of information and 
cognitive ability in the adoption process. Often by assuming implicitly that the cognitive ability 
of decision makers resembles the computational ability of the researcher, or on the other 
extreme, by simplifying the nature of the problem so much that the analysis of these factors 
becomes irrelvant.   
Extensive research about a subject tightly linked to the choice-under-ambiguity 
framework has been conducted by Manski (2005, 2004, 2003a, 2003b, 1995). This research 
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emphasizes the fact that exact knowledge of some outcomes (or their  probability distribution) 
cannot be derived even from an infinite number of observations. Thus, the specification of a 
unique distribution of expectations about those outcomes necessarily involves non-refutable 
assumptions (if applied to the identification problem faced by the analyst) or a lot of subjective 
judgement (from the point of view of the farmer). Manski’s motivation of an ambiguous 
scenario, however, is not necessarily related to a complex, changing environment or to subjects 
who are unable to measure uncertainty (or who do not use numerical probabilities to represent 
it), but more to the inherent unobservability of existing outcome probability distributions.  
Whichever motivation one might choose as a starting point, both lines of research point 
to the idea that decision-makers in non-experimental scenarios might not be able to exactly 
evaluate their expected utility from new technologies. This implies that farmers consider a range 
of expected utilities, rather than a specific value. I incorporate this feature in the model and use a 
choice criterion that was first proposed by Hurwicz (1951). This criterion is consistent with the 
spirit of boundedly rational agents who use simple decision rules when faced with ambiguity. It 
differs from standard utility maximization, in the model below, for farmers who are uncertain 
about their expected utility. It also includes the standard, single valued expected utility 
maximization, as a special case, for farmers who are confident about their calculations and their 
data.   
Although models of boundedly rational decision-makers have emphasized the limited (or 
costly) character of information and the less than perfect cognition of agents, they generally 
assume that these agents are still confident about their information and estimation and/or take 
decisions in observable or perfectly specified environments. Thus, they can be considered as 
corresponding to the special case of single-valued expected utility models mentioned above. An 
example of an approach that considers these aspects, and in fact represents the exception to the 
rule in the context of technology adoption modeling, is the work by Ellison and Fudenberg 
(1993). It represents an important departure from the standard Bayesian/rational framework and 
highlights important weaknesses related to the adoption predictions of the latter. 
In this article I propose an individual behavior technology adoption model for boundedly 
rational agents who also face ambiguity in their utility assessments. I also identify measurement 
biases in standard adoption models and propose alternative estimation strategies for both multi-
valued and single-valued expected utility cases. After specifying a general form of the model, I 5 
 
illustrate how it relates to a standard Bayesian approach and show how looking at the problem 
through the Bayesian lens brings the researcher back to the full rationality problem. I argue that 
the major restrictions are introduced when it comes to the assumptions about rationality and 
belief updating that help operationalize the model. I justify and propose an alternative approach 
that permits the researcher to make operational the model in a way that seems more sensible for a 
complicated setting like agriculture.  
The present approach proposes that in complicated environments farmers might have 
difficulties inferring full distributions of traits; thus, they do not form expectations about the 
statistical deviation of traits and rather try to locate their expected value through rules of thumb. 
These rules reflect that, in building their expectations about new technologies, farmers care 
primarily about the qualitative nature of observed information in terms of representativeness 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1974)) or closeness to their location. In the spirit of bounded 
rationality, decision-makers are featured as being myopic in that they do not aim to maximize 
more than one-period-ahead expected utility.
4  
Key findings are, first, that farmers’ ambiguity, with respect to the decision of whether to 
adopt a new variety or not, decreases as local conditions are more homogeneous and as 
computational ability, own experience and popularity of the variety increase. Second, that an 
ambiguity-averse farmer faced with a decision among very similar varieties might choose based 
on his familiarity with them or similar varieties. Third, that measurement biases associated with 
full rationality assumptions increase when decision-makers have low computational/cognitive 
ability, low experience with a variety or closely related varieties and when their farming 
conditions differ widely from the average adopter ones. Fourth, standard data exchangeability 
assumptions have lead to lack of attention to the information sorting and processing undertaken 
by farmers. Fifth, farmers sorting of information separates the population in heterogeneous 
groups that differ in their information structures and defines different adoption determinants. 
                                                 
4 My interest here is not to understand the motion of the problem, but to focus on the additional source of 
uncertainty introduced by the unobservability of part of the distribution of outcomes. Allowing for a forward-
looking agent would not change the essence of the problem, but would either introduce an additional assumption 
regarding the cognitive ability of the decision-maker (e.g. he would have to compute the expectation over time of 
traits that are perfectly observed at time t), or add a different source of uncertainty.  6 
 
2. Conceptual  Framework 
This article introduces the concept of ambiguity in the agricultural technology adoption literature 
and links it to boundedly rational agents. It seeks to relax the strict informational and cognition 
related assumptions of the full rationality framework of choice under uncertainty that are implied 
by traditional Bayesian analysis. Once one steps outside of those strict informational 
assumptions, however, a wide ocean of alternatives regarding expectation-beliefs and choice 
rules are possible. A main contribution to anchoring these alternatives in the terrain of what is 
humanly possible --as opposed to what is just “possible”- is Shafir (2003), who compiles the 
main writings about “Preference, Belief and Similarity” by Amos Tversky. In their work 
regarding judgement under uncertainty Tversky and Kahneman (1971; 1973; 1974; 1982) 
strongly emphasize that individuals make choices based on data of limited validity, processing it 
according to heuristic rules that assess likelihood based on similarity and ignore aspects like the 
relationship between sample size and sample variability.  
The study of choice under ambiguity is still a relatively new research area in economics -
-See working papers by L. Hansen, T. Sargent, L. Epstein and C. Manski—. It derives from two 
main lines of research that are concerned with unobservable properties of relevant variables in 
economic analysis. The first line has its origin in the study of the uncertainty faced by 
individuals making decisions and the second, which mostly analyses identification problems 
faced by econometricians (partial identification), originated as a study of inference with missing 
outcome data. Although the concepts of ambiguity and partial identification differ in their 
origins, these two lines of research are starting to converge in analyses where both the decision-
maker that is being studied faces an uncertainty or unobservability problem and the researcher 
faces a problem of missing data and identification. However, the fact that both concepts are often 
equated reflects a commonly blurry line between the decision-problem of the agents under study 
and the statistical problems faced by the analyst. This problem arises because of the need of the 
analyst to identify some variable of interest, which leads him to make statistical assumptions that 
result in assumptions about agents’ behavior and cognition. Generally, these imply strong 
restrictions regarding the scenarios under which the models will provide reasonable predictions. 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Schneider (2003; 
2006) have tried to axiomatize behavior of agents in scenarios where uncertainty might not be 
exactly measured. These studies are a response to the wide evidence that has been accumulated 7 
 
regarding the inconsistency of the Von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis in 
several decision-making scenarios. Other studies have seen this as a problem related to the 
amount of relevant information that an agent has in the moment that he makes a choice. When 
agents have too little information they might not even build prior beliefs about a choice attribute 
(Ellsberg 1961) or might hold multiple beliefs (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), in this case, about 
the traits of a technology. In all of these cases, decision-makers have to make choices under 
ambiguity.  
Aspects that contribute to the type of uncertainty that determines ambiguity are limited 
(or costly) information and less than perfect cognition. These aspects have been analyzed by the 
bounded rationality literature, but have not necessarily been linked to complicated environments 
or identification issues (Rubinstein 1989). Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) (E&F onward) 
considered farmers as boundedly rational agents in two different dimensions. In the context of 
limited information, they specify an agent’s observability range (window width), which is 
thought of as an informational constraint that impedes agents to observe outcomes at faraway 
locations, or alternatively, is “ the result of players’ prior belief that faraway locations are 
sufficiently different and experiences there are not relevant to their own decisions.” (P.614). On 
the perspective that decision-makers have limited cognition, they specify an information 
updating mechanism --based on popularity and inertia -- which is much simpler and requires less 
information than the standard Bayesian one.  
Although their’s is a population model – for which this work has been criticized because 
it makes difficult the direct comparison with individual behavior standard rational-actor models -  
the essential informational, cognitive and behavioral features associated with representative 
agents are an important departure from the standard Bayesian/rational framework which 
highlights two main weaknesses related to the adoption predictions of these models. First, in 
E&F’s model, agents reevaluate their choices, such that –in the technology adoption setting- they 
might disadopt a technology. And second, they allow for enough heterogeneity of agents such 
that, even under full information, they will not all make the same choice.   
In scenarios where there is a range of possible outcomes or where, at least, this is the 
expectation, choices are not likely to be the result of conventional utility maximization. Manski 
(2004) has put forward reasonable alternative decision rules in ambiguous settings. One is the 
maxmin rule, proposed by Wald(1945). A second one, proposed by Hurwicz(1951) consists of 8 
 
the maximization of a weighted average of the minimum and maximum values of the objective 
function that are feasible for each alternative. However, unlike the latter, the maxmin has been 
made into an axiom by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and shown to correspond to preferences 
that account for aversion against risk and ambiguity. They showed that these preferences can be 
numerically represented by a robust utility functional (see also Follmer and Schied 2004; Section 
2.5).  They interpret the non-exact knowledge of a probability distribution as resulting in a set of 
prior models, which possibly describe the probabilities of future scenarios. This type of 
preferences have only recently started to be used in applied analysis, in particular, and 
increasingly, in analysis of optimal investment decisions (Talay and Zheng 2002, Quenez 2004, 
Schied 2004, 2005; Burgert and Ruschendorf  2005, Muller 2005, and Hernandez-Hernandez and 
Schied 2006). 
In order to focus on the factors determining ambiguity and how these interact with rules 
of thumb by boundedly rational agents, I do not consider strategic interactions among agents, 
which have been subject of  study by several authors in the technology adoption literature 
(Bandiera and Rasul; Udry and Conley). However, social effects might have some bearing in 
determining the way in which farmers sort out information and strategic delays in adoption could 
be seen as the result of the ambiguity faced by farmers. For example, Bandiera and Rasul (2005) 
find that in Mozambique adoption choices are positively correlated within the networks of family 
and friend, pointing to a sorting criterion that is socially or trust related. These and other authors 
(Kremer and Miguel) also find ‘negative social effects’ on adoption which are attributed to 
strategic considerations. However, negative effects of increases in adoption within the social 
group could also be linked to conflicts in information rather than endogenous behavior.  
 
3.    Model Formulation 
This section examines the decision of a farmer i, who chooses a variety j at time t, from a fixed 
choice set C. Each farmer i is located in an information region N which consists of trial 
information about a group of farmers IN  who are close to him. A farmer’s “location” is defined 
by characteristics that he considers relevant for his production performance and closeness refers 
to the similarity along these characteristics or dimensions. 
Each farmer perfectly observes the input price for each variety, Pijt  and imperfectly 
observes a set of traits, Xijt. Traits in this set considered by other authors are input-use (Foster 9 
 
and Rosenzweig (1995) and Udry and Conley (2004)), yield (Feder and O’Mara(1981), Fisher, 
Arnold and Gibbs (1996)) and profitability of the new seed (Besley and Case(1994)). Indeed, 
farmers take decisions based on these and other imperfectly observed traits of the technology 
such as its complexity or its environmental sustainability. In what follows, I will refer to a 
generic trait or a set of traits.  
In the spirit of a complicated environment and one where agents who have less than 
perfect cognition, the model proposes that farmers do not think in terms of full distributions; 
thus, they do not form expectations about the statistical dispersion of a random trait, they rather 
try to locate its mean value through naturally observed signal frequencies and rules of thumb (An 
approach to expectations that involves no probability explicitly is more simple and general than 
is implied by the standard treatment of expectation defined in terms of probability. Such an 
approach has been developed by, for example, Krantz et. al. (1971)
5). The rules of thumb used 
by agents reflect that, in building their expectations about new technologies, farmers care first 
about the qualitative nature of observed information (particularly the closeness or relevance to 
their location), and then consider the quantitative performance.  
3.1 Uncertain Traits 
The uncertainty related to imperfectly observed traits originates both in their direct experience 
with the crop and the information they access.  Imperfect observability arises for farmers who 
have previously used or experimented with a variety, because they might not perfectly perceive 
the received trait. As an illustration, farmers might not discover borers in a good share of plants 
and might thus perceive incorrectly the pest control performance of a new technology. Similarly, 
farmers might not calculate how much of a yield advantage/disadvantage a variety provides until 
infestation levels are really high. Also, different seeds of the same variety might perform better 
than others in a random manner (there is attribute variability about some mean attribute level 
which reflects “inherent product variability” (Roberts and Urban (1988), Erdem and Keane 
(1996, 1997)). The uncertainty can be described as follows. If  X
N
j  is the mean attribute level of 
variety  j in location N  
                                                 
5 Whether expectation or probability is the more fundamental concept has been a subject of debate in the theory of 
subjective probability.  Krantz et. al. (1971), however, give axioms for conditional expected utility directly --
expected utility is not analyzed into utility and probability in the standard fashion where utility is the integral (sum 
in discrete case) over all states of the world of the products of probability and utility in each state-- and show that 
structural axioms are required to prove that the representation in terms of probability is possible. 
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j + δ ijt = Xj + ξ
N+ δ ijt  = Xj + γ ijt       ξ
N ~ d1(0, sz
2), δ ijt~ d2(0, sd
2)                 (1) 
 
where δ ij  refers to the variability of farmers experiences with the attribute levels of varieties and 
ξ
N to the variability of these experiences with respect to the overall mean. The respective 
variances of these random terms are sd
2 and sz
2.     
Farmers who have not grown variety j in the past depend on trait information based on 
use or trials on others’ farms (received through neighbors, media, seed dealers, university 
extension agents, and so forth). Thus, they receive H noisy signals from different sources: 
 
                              O
 h
ijt = Xj + ω
h
ijt                ω ijt~ d(0, sw




ijt  is the noise of information source h  and sw
2 is the variance of ω
h





Farmers are imperfectly informed and hence uncertain about new varieties’ mean trait 
levels in their location X
N
j . Furthermore, they do not observe the distribution or even variance of 
the different types of information noise (sz
2, sd
2, sw
h2). They form expectations or beliefs about 
variety mean trait levels (only) based on observed information up to time t and on subjective 
perceptions.  
For each variety  j ∈  C, let EN (Xj) be the farmer’s expected mean trait level for variety j 
in location or region N. Let Ii(t) be the information set of farmer i  which contains all information 
that he has observed up to time t about the factors that affect his expected utility. The “state” of a 
farmer consists of all factors that affect his expected utility. If these factors are all observed, then 
Ii(t) characterizes the state of a farmer. If there exist unobserved factors and all information about 
them is contained in ∆ i( t), then the belief about the mean EN(Xj) might differ from EN (Xj| Ii(t)), 
the belief about mean traits conditional on the information that actually is observed by i. That is, 
the farmer recognizes that the information that is accessible to him is not necessarily a good 
predictor of performance under his own growing conditions. More specifically:  
 
               EN (Xj) = EN (Xj| Ii(t))*ψ j({|Ii(t)|1,…, |Ii(t)|J}, ei) + EN [Xj| ∆ i( t)]* ψ j(∆ i( t), ei)      (3) 
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where ψ j({|Ii(t)|j1,…, |Ii(t)|jJ}, ei) is the likelihood that a farmer assigns to observable information 
about new varieties being an accurate predictor of his own situation [for simplicity of notation I 
will onwards denote  ψ j({|Ii(t)|j1,…, |Ii(t)|jJ}, ei) = ψ j(.)) and ψ j(∆ i( t), ei)=1- ψ j(.)].  This likelihood 
depends on the amount of information about each specific variety in i's information set, |Ii(t)|k, 
and on i's computational ability, ei, in the following way: ψ k‘(.)>0, ψ kk’’(.)<0, where k can be ei 
or |Ii(t)|j. Also, if alternative varieties can be classified according to their similarity to j, such that 
g1 are all similar varieties and g2 are not, then ψ |Ii(t)|j‘(.)> ψ |Ii(t)|g1‘(.)> ψ |Ii(t)|g2‘(.). 
Then, the beliefs of the farmer about the mean trait levels of a variety are confidence-
weighted-averages of one objectively rational and one purely subjective part. The objective part 
relates to his information set. The subjective part is based on perceptions or hypotheses about 
how unobservable factors might affect the local mean traits. It is viewed as purely subjective in 
the sense that it does not depend on observable information. Further implications of (3) will be 
discussed later in this section. 
3.2 Utility 
The local utility that a farmer i gets from a crop variety j in period t depends on its perfectly and 
imperfectly observed traits as follows:  
 
                            U
N
ijt = -aPijt + b X
N
ijt + ε ijt                                                (4) 
  
Equation (4) is an indirect utility function with the income term suppressed.
6 Pijt is the price 
farmer i pays for variety j, which is perfectly observed and Xijt represents the generic trait which 
cannot be perfectly observed by the farmer at the time he makes his decision. 
The expected utility of farmer i associated with the indirect utility function in equation 
(4), for variety j is: 
 
EN [Uijt]    =    -aPijt + b EN [Xijt] + ε ijt  
 
 
Thus,   EN [Uijt]    =   -aPijt + b EN[Xj]  + ε ijt ,    if j is a new variety                       (5a)  
                                                 
6 The income term cancels out in the logit formulation of choice probabilities. 12 
 
                             
and       EN[Uijt]     =  -aPijt + b X
N
j  + ε ijt ,         if j is a traditional variety              (5b)        
 
The expected utility of consuming variety j is a linear function of price and expected levels of the 
local mean traits, which are imperfectly observed for new varieties.
 7 For traditional varieties, 
mean trait levels are observed, and (5b) is no longer of interest in the ensuing discussion. The 
second equality is true because δ ij and ω
h
ijt have zero mean and the stochastic component, ε ijt, 
stays the same as in (3) because it is stochastic from the researcher’s point of view.  
Substituting (3) into (5a) yields the expected utility for new varieties based on observed 
and unobserved factors: 
         
                  EN [Uijt] = -aPijt + b(EN [Xj| Ii(t)] * ψ j(.)+ EN [Xj| ∆ it]* ψ j(∆ it ,. )) + ε ijt              (6) 
 
In order to choose among varieties, the farmer seeks to maximize his immediate expected utility 
by comparing the relative expected utility provided by alternative varieties. He builds several 
hypotheses about how unobservable factors might affect the local mean traits and aims to 
calculate an expected level of the mean trait across hypothetical scenarios. The farmer knows 
that X
N








j} minimum and 






jG].  In order to 
estimate the most likely scenario, or average over several of them in a specific period,
8 the 
farmer would have to associate each specific x
N
jg , g=1,..G with a likelihood pg
k, of occurrence in 
each hypothetical scenario sk ∈ ∆  i , where k=1,…K and ∪ ksk = ∆  i .That is, the farmer would 
have to calculate EN [Xj| sk]= Σg x
N
jg pg
k(sk), for all k whereby he would have to estimate GxK 
likelihood values. However, several studies suggest that, particularly in complicated 
environments, decision-makers neither wish nor tend to infer such probabilities (Ellsberg 1961).  
Instead farmers consider a full range of potential outcomes. Thus EN [Xj| ∆ it] is replaced 
by a vector of feasible potential realizations and EN [Uijt] belongs to a set of possible expected 
                                                 
7 By focusing on uncertainty in mean attribute levels,  I assume risk neutral preferences.  An analysis of risk 
behavior is eyond the scope of this paper. It is however likely to be an important part of decision making, especially 
under bounded rationality. The model can be generalized to include risk by including a quadratic term of the 
expectation of the attribute:  
E[Uij | Ii]= -aPij + b E[Xij| Ii] – b r E[Xij| Ii]
2 -  b r E[ (Xij - E[Xij| Ii] )]
2  + eij                                                
8 For simplicity of notation, I omit the period subscript of scenarios in the arguments below. 13 
 
utilities. More specifically, let R{EN [Uijt] } denote the set of possible expected utilities 
considered by the farmer, then: 
 




{ -aPijt+b(EN [Xj| Ii(t)]*ψ  j(.) + x
N
j0*ψ j(∆ it,ei)) , -aPijt+b(EN [Xj| Ii(t)]*ψ  j(.) + x
N
j1* ψ j(∆ it, ei)) }         
 
(7) 
                                     
Making a decision based on such a multi-valued expected utility can be described as a choice 
under ambiguity, which originates because the farmer feels that there is no way to infer 
meaningful probabilities for the hypothetical scenarios determined by unobservable factors. In 
this case, the farmer’s choices are likely not the result of a standard expected utility 
maximization process. Yet, if their behavior is “deliberate and orderly…it can be described in 
terms of a simple, specified decision rule” (Ellsberg; p.646).
9 
From the specification in Equation (7) one can deduce that the size of the range of 
expected utilities considered,  |R{EN [Uijt]}|, depends on three factors:  











(2)  the amount of trait information that the decision-maker has observed for each 
variety,                             {|Ii(t)|1,…, |Ii(t)|J} 
(3)  and his computational ability, ei . 
Result 1.a:   For similar localities, farmers that have more experience or more data and more 
computational ability are also more confident about this observed data and have less uncertainty 
about the utility received from new technologies.  
Result 1.b:  The degree of (unmeasurable) uncertainty that farmers with similar information sets 
and computational ability face increases in the spread of the local trait distribution.  
                                                 
9 The same author points out that “In reaching a decision under these circumstances, many people seem to act 
conservatively. Without actually expecting the worst, they choose to act as if the worst outcomes were somewhat 
more likely than their best estimates of likelihood would indicate”. 14 
 
Result 2:   An individual’s comparative ignorance
10 might influence choices when faced with a 
complicated environment. That is, an ambiguity averse farmer --who maximizes his expected 
utility in the worst case scenario)-- and who chooses among two new varieties that cost the same 
and have the same based-on-observable-information expected trait means, will choose the one 
that is more familiar to him.  




j}) as a 
normalized interval (0,1). By substituting this into the expected utility region (7) it can be seen 
that the uncertainty region depends only on ψ j(∆ i( t), ei)=1- ψ j(.). Recalling from (3) that 
ψ |Ii(t)|j‘(.)> ψ |Ii(t)|g1‘(.)> ψ |Ii(t)|g2‘(.), it is obvious that this region is smaller for more familiar 
varieties because the farmer has more confidence about correctly observing their traits. Since Pijt 
and EN [Xj| Ii(t)] are the same for the compared varieties the lower bound of the expected utility 
region is higher for the familiar variety, and the uncertainty averse farmer makes his choice 
maximizing lower bounds. 
Result 2 highlights the importance of the similarity notion, not only when sorting out 
information signals for calculating expected mean traits, but also for reducing the range of 
uncertainty that relates to ambiguity. It reflects the fact that choices by farmers might be based 
on familiarity and/or popularity (because the size of the information set that a farmer has for a 
specific variety j depends on the number of observations that a farmer receives from own 
experimentation and from other’s experimentation) not only of the chosen variety but of similar 
varieties. This explains the type of choice “inertia” (E&F) that has been observed by several 
studies of agricultural technology adoption, but also points to the possibility of “transfer” 
(Suppes 1994) across similar varieties. It thus points to a fundamental weakness of previous 
studies, which have focused on the adoption of a single new variety contrasting it to a 
fundamentally different traditional alternative, which is not able to capture this transfer. As an 
example, a farmer who already grows non-genetically-modified herbicide-resistant (HR) 
varieties might be more likely to transfer to new, never used, genetically-modified (GM) HR 
varieties than a farmer who never chose HR existing varieties and who also has no experience 
with the new GM types. The former faces lower uncertainty regarding the management of the 
new varieties. A study that does not consider this type of similarity and which uses own 
                                                 
10 See Fox and Tversky in Shafir (2004). 15 
 
experience as a determinant of demand for the new variety will assign the same likelihood of 
adopting the new GM-HR variety to both farmers. 
 
3.3 Identification Issues 
A researcher who seeks to estimate expected utility in equation (6) and who relies on 
observational data faces two identification issues, that combined create a third identification 
issue:  
Identification Issue 1:   Unobservability of  the second term in (6), EN [Xj| ∆ it]  
Identification Issue 2:   Unobservability of the farmers information region, or reference 
information set N and of its boundries.  
Identification Issue 3:   Because of identification issues 1 and 2, the trait preference parameters, 
b, might be not identified or be only partially identified.  
In this section I only elaborate on the first and third identification problems and derive 
some measurement biases that arise in standard frameworks because of them. I discuss the 
second identification issue later in the farmer-location section.  
The first identification problem is related to the fact that, given a random sample and 
observability by the analyst of Ii(t), the sampling process asymptotically reveals E[Xj| Ii(t)], but is 
uninformative about E[Xj| ∆  i]. Thus, based on the empirical evidence alone, farmers’ 
expectations about the mean trait level E[Xj] cannot be identified by the researcher, even 
conditional on all observed information.  
By the nature of E[Xj| ∆  i] no observable variables are useful instruments for precisely 
predicting this expectation. Thus, researchers seeking to identify E[Uijt] have assumed that 
although agents are unable to observe some factors influencing their decision, they do observe 
their distribution. Thus, they observe E[Uijt]= bE[Xj| Ii(t)]+vi. The analyst then specifies, 
somewhat arbitrarily, a distribution for vi across the population, which allows both the decision 
maker and the analyst to infer Evi and the beliefs E[Xj] from the actual choices. However, this 
identification approach is problematic, not only because it presupposes that individuals are able 
to measure the uncertainty, but also because it assumes that the degree of this uncertainty is 
exogenous to characteristics of the individual such as cognitive ability or experimentation.  




jG], the decision-maker uses some 
heuristic method that seems sensible for the setting under consideration in order to decide among 16 
 
alternatives. The most common approach of researchers has been to assume that the decision-
maker is ambiguity averse and accepts the greatest expected value of his uncertainty horizon 
which will give him some minimal specified utility level. Since this minimal level is not known 
by the researcher, the practice is to derive a set of possible results based on several thresholds 
(How specifically this approach determines choice is examined in the Decision Rules section 
below). Since expectations determine choices and choices reveal preferences for traits, 
identification problems related to expectations lead to identification problems for preference 
parameters.
11 
Result 3 (Identification Issue 3): Expectation-identification issues lead to the following 
identification problems for preferences for traits: 
1.) For given choices, a range of possible expected utilities associated with the 
unobservability of E[Xj| ∆  i] determines a range of possible preferences for traits. 
2.) The variation in expectations associated with location characteristics might be confused 
with preference heterogeneity. This might result in incorrect willingness-to-pay estimates 
for choice traits.  
Proof of Result 3.2.:Let Ζ i be the characteristic that determines a farmer’s location, such that  
EN [Xj] = Ζ i E[Xj].  Then the corresponding expected utility is  
EN [Uijt] = -α  p + bEN [Xj] = -α  p +  bΖ i E[Xj]  .  If the expected willingness-to-pay for a trait is 
defined by EWTP(x) = dp/d(Ε N x), then EWTP(x) = - bΖ i/α.  
Analysis that tests for heterogeneity in preference parameters across individuals commonly 
specifies preference heterogeneity as b^=bΖ i . If the researcher does not control for location he 
will find an heterogeneous measure of willingness-to-pay for traits that equates in form the one 
above (EWTP(x) = - bΖ i/α  ) but he will justify it on completely different grounds. This is so 
because the expected utility will be identical  
E [Uijt] = -α  p +  bΖ i E[Xj]  in the two settings.   
Alternatively, if expected willingness to pay is defined locally as E N WTP(x ) = dp/d(Ε N 
x), then an analysis of preference heterogeneity that assumes E[Xj]  =  EN[Xj]  will incorrectly 
estimate E N WTP(x )  as  - bΖ i/α.  
3.4 Measurement Biases Under Full Rationality 
                                                 
11 This point was noted as early as in 1961 by Ellsberg.  17 
 
The implicit identification approach, the one most commonly used, views farmers as having a 
’very big’ information set and perfect cognition or computational ability. If this is the case, and 
the farmer has full observability, his information set would contain all information that might 
possibly influence his expected utility and/or the probability distribution of the future expected 
utilities (such that this set describes his state), and then  ψ j({|Ii(t)|1,…, |Ii(t)|J}, ei)  = 1.  
Furthermore, the farmer is generally assumed to compute his expectations based on all 
information rather than on those expectations that arise from conditions most similar to his. The 
assumption underlying this reasoning is that the process determining trait outcomes is stationary 
(over time and across space), which implies that the true mean trait should not change across 
locations. This, in the world of subjective probabilities, is further tied to the assumption of 
exchangeability in the data. Data or information about a stationary process is most likely to be 
exchangeable (See Suppes (1994) for a discussion on these concepts). That is, the order (in terms 
of location or timing) of the data is not relevant for determining its expectation, or as Epstein 
(2006) puts it, information about each observation is assumed to be a priori the same.
12   
In terms of the model presented, these assumptions result in a simplified form of (6):  
 
             EN [Uijt] = E [Uijt | Ii(t)]  =  -aPijt + b E[Xj| Ii(t)]  + ε ijt                                      (6’)       
 
This approach has been a standard assumption in the learning literature because it is a way to get 
back to the world that the researcher is able to observe. However, estimations based on these 
assumptions are subject to two sources of measurement bias (MB) in a bounded-rationality 
environment: 
 
MB1 =  (EN [Xj | Ii(t)] - E[Xj | Ii(t)] )  
 
MB2 =  (EN [Xj] - EN [Xj | Ii(t)] ) 
 
The first source of measurement bias arises because the farmer does not estimate a mean trait 
based on all observed signals. The farmer cares about the quality of these data (in terms of the 
                                                 
12 Exchangeability is a weaker form of independence that is used by subjectivists and is assumed by the Bayesian 
framework (Suppes 1986).  18 
 
information that they convey regarding potential outcomes on his own farm). Therefore, he sorts 
out the information he receives before processing it. As opposed to standard models of 
agricultural technology adoption, this model emphasizes the need to sort out observed 
information, not only the need to access information, as an obstacle to learning about true traits 
of a new technology.  
Result 4 (Measurement Bias under full rationality 1): The assumption of data exchangeability in 
standard frameworks, results in lack of attention to the information sorting and processing 
undertaken by farmers.  
Proof of Result 4 : The data in this model are composed by trial observations. Exchangeability of 
observations across space implies that location is not relevant to the trial outcomes. Thus EN [Xj | 
Ii(t)] = E[Xj | Ii(t)], implying that the data do not need to be sorted out. The next section provides 
a deeper analysis of the sorting process. 
The second source of measurement bias is related to the perception of the farmer that the 
data he has observed in his location are non-random (for a given location). That is, that 
information signals are not based on trials that are representative of the whole local population 
such that when randomly drawing from them and calculating a mean trait, this mean will not 
necessarily be close to the true local mean.   
Result 5 (Measurement Bias under full rationality 2):  The measurement bias associated with the 
assumption of full observability of the distribution of outcomes in a specific location is larger 
for:  a) farmers with lower computational ability, b) farmers with lower amount of experience 
with the variety or with closely related varieties, c) farmers whose farming conditions differ 
mostly from the conditions of previous variety j adopters. 
Proof of Result 5 :  The measurement bias 1 is defined as MB1 = EN [Xijt] - EN [Xijt | Ii(t)].  
Substituting equation (3) yields:  
MB1 =  EN [Xj| Ii(t)] * ψ j(.)+ EN [Xj| ∆ it]* ψ j(∆ it ,. ) - EN [Xj| Ii(t)]                                       
=  EN [Xj| Ii(t)] * (ψ j(.) – 1)+ EN [Xj| ∆ it]* ψ j(∆ it ,. )                                       
= EN [Xj| Ii(t)] * ψ j(.) - EN [Xj| ∆ it]* ψ j(. ) + EN [Xj| ∆ it] - EN [Xj| Ii(t)] 
= (EN [Xj| Ii(t)] - EN [Xj| ∆ it])* ψ j(. ) – (EN [Xj| Ii(t)] - EN [Xj| ∆ it] ) 
= (EN [Xj| Ii(t)] - EN [Xj| ∆ it])* (ψ j(. ) – 1)  
= (EN [Xj| ∆ it] - EN [Xj| Ii(t)])* (1-ψ j({|Ii(t)|1,…, |Ii(t)|J}, ei)) 19 
 
In order to better understand the second source of measurement bias it is necessary to uncover 
the complexity of the information sorting and processing undertaken by decision-makers. This 
data selection process amounts to contradicting the exchangeability assumption of standard 
frameworks and reveals the difference between EN[Xj| Ii(t)] and E[Xj| Ii(t)] for the farmer. This 
will be discussed in the next section, where the expectation formation process EN[Xj| Ii(t)] is 
described. 
3.5 Expectation Formation Process 
A farmer’s current beliefs about the observable local mean traits of a variety j can be partitioned 
according to the time of information acquisition. At the beginning of a period, before making 
choices among varieties, he has some prior expectation that is based on observed signals up to 
that time, EN [Xj |Ii(t-1)]. At the end of the period, the harvest is done and the farmer observes the 
outcomes on his land and hears about the outcomes of other farmers. He observes the difference 
between actual trial realizations X
h
ijt and his ex-ante calculations and uses this difference to infer 
part of the mean trait (the observable part) in the next period ( EN [Xj | Ii(t)]), as follows.
13  For 
simplicity of notation, I will include own experience as part of the set H of information sources 
and denote the information received from each source by X
h. 
 






ijt - EN [X
N,h
ijt |Ii(t-1)])            (8) 
 
where D is an indicator that is equal to one if farmer i has received information from source h 
about variety j and at time t , β
h are weights attached to the surprise elements of different 
information sources (0< β
h<1).  Since the random terms ω
h
ijt  (in equations 1 and 2) have zero 
mean the expected level of information obtained via experience is equal to the expected level of 
information received via other information sources: EN [X
N,h
ijt | Ii(t-1)] =  EN [X
N
j | Ii(t-1)] and (8) 
can be rewritten as: 
 




ijt                        (8’) 
    
where  h= 1,...,H ,  ρo ijt = (1- Σhρ
h








                                                 
13 However, this is reevaluated right before making the next choice as explained below. 20 
 
The ρi coefficients can be interpreted as the weights farmers attach to alternative information 
sources  in updating their expectations about variety traits. Recursively solving equation (8’), it 
can be rewritten as an expression that depends on the accumulation of information in every 
period: 
  EN[Xj | Ii(t)] = ρ
^












o ij = ∏
t






o ijk(1- ρo ij1), …, ρ
^h
1,ijt= (1- ρo ijt), 
 
Farmers can obtain maximum one observation from own experience each year. However, other 
sources of information provide multiple signals (O
 h
ijt ) that are sorted out and processed by the 
farmer in terms of their relevance to his own potential outcomes.
 14  In order to do this, the 
farmer first considers his location in terms of the observable factors that are most relevant for his 
trait outcomes. Let farmer i's perceived location be denoted by the vector of farming conditions 
Zi =(Gi, Li, Mi), where Gi is farmer i’s geographical location, Li are farm characteristics, and Mi 
is a farmer’s management ability. The farmer is partially informed about the location or trial 
conditions on other farms Z
h
l , l={1,…,n}: l≠  I,  on which each information signal O
 h
ijt has been 
based. He evaluates the distance between his own relevant farming conditions Zi and the 
observed Z
h
l ‘s, using a distance function d(Zi Z
h
l). He then selects a set of signals N = {O
 h
ijt : d(Zi 
Z
h





l) > dki )). Thus, if d is above a certain threshold for a specific O
 h
ijt he includes it in his 
summary measure of others’ information.  
How might he construct such a summary measure? Two modes of reasoning have been 
studied in the financial investment literature and are very common in generating these types of 
assessments (Gayer, Gilboa and Liberman 2004). According to these, the farmer might use a 
case-based or a rule-based summary measure. The former relies on an (weighted) average of 
signals that considers locations through the similarity or distance measure. The latter uses each 
of the factors determining the location to infer a rule about the relationship of factors to 
outcomes, and then uses this rule to predict outcomes in the specific location.  
The case-based assessment is: 
 
                                                 
14 Recall that in equation (8’’) I used simplified notation such that X
N,h








ijt * (ΣlΣh s(Zi Z
h
l))






jt = ΣlΣh O
 h
ijt* (N+H)
-1         ( 9 )  
 
The rule-based assessment is: 
 
Oljt = α  Z
h




jt = α 1 Gi + α 2 Li + α 3 Mi       ( 1 0 )  
 
A farmer using method one averages all the “cases” that have similar characteristics tohis own. A 
farmer using the second method is more sophisticated, weights each of the relevant 
characteristics in terms of their influence on outcomes, and uses all stored information in order to 
approximate outcomes in his location. While both farmers seek to approximate outcomes at their 
own location, the former believes that outcomes at faraway locations are irrelevant to his 
decisions. Which type of method the farmer uses is an empirical question.  
3.6 Farmer Location Discussion 
The second aspect mentioned above which generally poses a problem to the researcher is the 
identification of a farmer’s  “information region” N. Information flows have been regarded as the 
result of communication with others through e.g. family-, ethnic-, religious and/or financial 
networks. As an example, Munshi and Myaux (1998) explain how in rural India communication 
barriers may arise across religious groups. Thus, the identification problem has been generally 
seen as the problem of distinguishing between the effects on behavior of flows of information 
between farmers along those dimensions and the effects of spatially-correlated growing 
conditions. However, in a world with very widespread access to information (where new 
information technologies such as internet, television and cellular phones have reached remote 
rural areas), the information available to farmers across the dimensions mentioned above might 
look very similar. Arguably, what matters in such a context is which information the farmer 
stores and how he processes it. The perception of a farmer about his location determines the 22 
 
dimensions that a farmer considers when sorting out available information; that is, the observable 
factors that he thinks are most important for the outcomes in his farm. The distance or similarity 
measure used to define his neighborhood is then a function of these factors. In agricultural 
settings, location is based on farming conditions which might be determined by variables like 
geographical location, farm characteristics, and/or farmer management ability.  
Simple approaches have assumed that the farmer’s perception of location is associated 
with his farm’s geographical location only. In agricultural settings this might be sensible given 
that crop performance is tightly related to agronomic conditions and given that information 
disseminated about trials often includes the geographic location but no specifics about plot soil, 
size or management conditions. In this case, flows of information and local growing conditions 
are perfectly correlated and their effects cannot be identified separately. The identification 
problem for the researcher is identifying the reach or the limits of the geographical location 
(geographical window width).  However, if farmers are able to control for other dimensions 
when building the information region these should be considered as well and this is done as in 
equations (9) and (10). In this case, the identification problem for the researcher is identifying 
which characteristics are observed in order to characterize his location. 
In period zero, when a new variety is introduced and nobody has experimented with a 
new variety, a farmer cannot approximate local performance based on the above rules. Thus, his 
prior is that the mean trait level of that variety is normally distributed about the crop class local 
mean (AN). Thus, letting Ii(0) denote the farmer’s prior information about the crop class, we have 
that EN [Xj |Ii(0)] = AN. Notice that a farmer’s initial belief is associated with his location, which 
is determined by his farming conditions. Thus, initial beliefs are not only crop specific but take 
into account farming conditions. Sociologists usually think of these initial reference values as 
reflecting different “adoption thresholds” or as differences in responsiveness to social pressure 
(Valente 1995; 2005; Young 2006).  
Substituting initial beliefs and farmers location into (8’’) yields: 
 
           EN[Xj | Ii(t)] = ρ
^








jt                    (8’’’) 
 
Equations 1-8 define a general model which by itself does not preclude a Bayesian interpretation 
and implementation of the same. The key aspects which further determine the informational 23 
 
structure of the individuals, apart from the nature of the information region (local or not), is the 
definition of the weights attached to different information types (new versus old and own versus 
others’) and the timing of events in each period. 
3.7 Making the Model Operational 
The Bayesian updating mechanism has been the most widely used expectation updating 
framework in the technology adoption studies that implements dynamic adoption frameworks 
(Feder and O’Mara (1981), Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995)).
15 It 
provides important intuition about underlying relations of factors that affect learning under a 
specific setting; that is, when the assumptions of the model hold. However, they are strong 
assumptions, both in terms of the decision maker’s cognitive ability and the resulting aggregate 
prediction pattern (Young 2006, Fisher, Arnold and Gibbs 1996). They might have very 
unrealistic implications.  
In this section I first explain the main assumptions of the Bayesian framework and then 
justify and propose an alternative approach. A discussion follows explaining how looking at the 
problem through the Bayesian lens brings the researcher back to a reliance on the full rationality 
assumption. I argue that the restrictiveness of this approach fundamentally arises from the 
assumptions required to pin down the weights that decision-makers attach to different types of 
information. Another fundamental weakness of the approach, which is not related to its 
restrictiveness, is the lack of guidance as to how prior beliefs are generated. This weakness has 
lead to a misconception about the importance of the initial beliefs of agents in determining 
adoption and has lead to a selection bias problem in past studies of adoption. 
Bayesian Updating  
A standard Bayesian framework assumes that the error terms in equations (1) and (2) are iid, 
normally distributed and that the trait process is stationary (the true mean, variance and 
autocorrelation structure do not change over time). Then, a Bayesian updating rule can be used. 
This rule says that the information weights β
h in equation 8 are functions of the noise of  new 
information (variance s
h2 , including sd
2 of own experience and sw
h2 of alternative sources) 
adjusted by the precision of the beliefs (the inverse of the variance of the individual’s prediction 
error, 1/ s
x2(t)). All of the former parameters are assumed to be known by the farmer who assigns 
                                                 
15 Exceptions to this are Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) and Manski (1993). The former considers boundedly rational 
agents and an updating mechanism based on popularity weights and inertia. The latter sees decision-makers 
applying non-parametric regression methods. 24 
 
the following weights to alternative information sources (the other terms are as explained in the 
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-1                   (11) 
 
is the variance of the prediction error,
 16 which is a function of exchangeable information 
accumulated over time through different sources, the initial prediction error, and the precision of 
information sources.
17  Notice --in equations 8-8’’’-- that the weights assigned to the different 
information sources vary over time because the variance of the prediction error s
x2 varies over 
time. More specifically, each piece of observed information reduces the prediction error by the 
same amount, and regardless of the moment in time in which it was observed (independence of 
observations is then an obvious requirement. If observations were strongly dependent, then many 
observations would count no more than a single one).  
Not only must the data received by individuals be iid normally distributed, but 
individuals are assumed to know this and be able to characterize the true distribution of the 
information error as well. Additionally, these individuals keep track of all the trait levels 
observed historically, not only on their farm but also on their neighbors’ farms and remember for 
their calculations, at the time of their decision, all outcomes and advice from neighbors, seed 
dealers, extension agents and advertising seen in the media, since the new technology was 
introduced. Then, their information set is big enough to infer the past distribution of outcomes. 
Additionally, in order to make inference about the prediction variance in every period, the farmer 
is assumed to combine information signals through a process that amounts to a linear regression 
                                                 
16 Since each signal is considered unbiased by the farmer, the best minimum variance way of combine the 
information is: X^= Xj*1+ (X^- EX) = Xj*1+ u where X^ is a vector of all realizations observed by the farmer and  u 
a vector of prediction errors of the same dimension. Thus, V(u) is a (H+1)*(H+1) diagonal matrix with terms  
sx2(0), s
1,2/n1t,…, s




-1 which, for 
uncorrelated errors, is equation (7). 
17 In the seminal study by Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) utility is assumed to depend directly on the variance of the 
input-use prediction error. That is, the relevant trait is not input-use but its variability.  25 
 
(minimizing the squared error of the linear system of information signals) and invert an (H+1) 
squared variance-covariance matrix to finally know the variance of the prediction.  
According to (8, 10, 11), EN [Xj | Ii(t)] is a function of the farmer’s full prior distribution 
over Xj at time t. An important underlying assumption which is necessary to obtain this tractable 
and interpretable form of belief is that the process of the realized traits is stationary and it is also 
to be perceived so by the decision-maker. Additionally, it has been the norm to assume that 
common observations are available to decision-makers (and to the researcher) and these 
commonly accepted observations will often force their beliefs to converge (Suppes 1986). 
 
4. Alternative Approach 
When the complexity of the environment is perceived by the decision-makers, they might 
perceive information signals (equations 1 and 2) as not being independent of each other, or 
identically distributed (Epstein and Schneider (2006) describe such a setting, where agents doubt 
that their observed data are identically distributed). This alone renders the standard Bayesian 
updating inapplicable (and inappropriate) for this situation  Although some alternatives to the 
standard Bayesian framework have been recently studied by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), 
Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Schneider (2003; 2006), they generalize the framework in a 
way that might require even more cognitive ability of decision makers and contrasts with 
increasing evidence found by psychologists regarding subjective assessment of probabilities and 
expectations (Kahneman and Tversky (1973; 74), Slovic et. al. 1982; Shafir 2003). 
18  
Those generalized frameworks, as well as the standard Bayesian, take probabilities as 
primitives. Thus, even if a decision maker is allowed to be unsure and face ambiguity, he is 
assumed to think of the world like a statistician, in terms of probabilistic representations, with 
underlying coherent probability measures in probability spaces with a specific ordering and 
algebra of events. Not only is it hard to think in those terms, but even if one is a statistician it is 
                                                 
18 These authors have axiomatized behavior of agents in environments that are not well understood by agents. They 
have modeled agents decision-making and learning under ambiguity in two different ways. One has been to assume 
that agents have multiple priors and that they use likelihood-ratio test procedures to decide among priors. These 
agents are assumed to, then, only update the chosen priors (the ones that fit the observed data best) possibly in a 
Bayesian manner. A type of non-Bayesian updating has been studied by Epstein (xxx), but it requires high 
sophistication of the agents in order to be able to learn. The second one consists of specifying a non-additive 
measure of probability for the different types of uncertainty and using a non-standard integration procedure (based 
on Choquet integrals) to estimate expected utility.  
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hard to prove the existence of this underlying probabilistic representation or to test what axioms 
in fact are satisfied. A statement by Patrick Suppes provides an argument against an 
interpretation of subjective expectations in terms of subjective probabilities: 
“It may be argued that in ordinary experience expectation rather than probability is the more 
widely used concept. As I have put it elsewhere, the argument for this is evident from a practical 
standpoint. Once we leave events and talk about what correspond to random variables it is natural 
in ordinary talk to want to know only the expectation and not the full probability distribution. Thus 
we talk about the expectation of walking at least 10 km in the next 3 days, the expectation of at 
least 3 cm of rain in the next 8 hours, or the expectation that the rate of inflation in the next year 
will be about 9%. In all of these cases, we are dealing in a natural way with a quantitative variable, 
but we are not prepared to give, and are really not interested in giving, the full probability 
distribution of that variable or even, usually, the variance.” (Comment on The Axioms of Subjective 
Probability, P. Suppes, P.59) 
I, thus, choose to use the simple but general updating framework presented above (without 
Bayesian updating). It is general in the sense that the farmer is neither assumed to characterize 
the whole probability distribution of the random variable X
N
ijt , nor to think in terms of 
probabilities. Thus, a belief is conceived as a mean belief or an empirical frequency, rather than 
as a full description of likelihood under all alternative states of the world. As such, no sample 
space or algebra of events is involved.   
Up to now, observability and computational ability issues have been partially addressed by 
the proposed use of local expectations. This is similar in nature to the idea of decision-makers 
being able to observe outcomes within their “window width”; as proposed by E&F. It limits the 
information considered by decision-makers and addresses informational constraints, 
computational capacity problems or simply farmer’s beliefs regarding the irrelevance, to their 
own decisions, of experiences at faraway locations. Also, in equation (1) own-information 
signals were allowed to have a local error component that is distributed differently from the 
idiosyncratic component. 
There are three key aspects further representing alternatives to the standard framework 
which remain unspecified (or just briefly mentioned). One is the definition of the weights 
attached to different information types in each period (‘new versus old and own versus others’), 
the second is the timing of the complete expectation formation process, and the third is the 
decision rule used. In the following subsections I address these issues. 27 
 
4.1 Information Weights and Rules of Thumb 
Farmers who do not store and process all the information that they observe care about 
information precision in terms of its representativeness --similarity to their own conditions—
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) rather than about an absolute or objective measure of variance of 
the information error over the whole population (“Objective" here means analysis of a signal out 
of context and without regard to the recipient). In fact, empirical studies have consistently found 
that, when available, recent own-farm information is the most precise and unbiased information 
available to an individual farmer” (Marra et. al 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig). Thus, when this 
type of information is available in a specific period, a farmer sticks to a rule that overwrites his 
initial beliefs and the information received through alternative sources with own experience. 
Since this information is scarce and accurate, over time he stores all of these signals. However, if 
there is one period in which the farmer decides not to grow the same variety, then in the next 
period he will use the most recent information received from other sources (if available) 
combined with his own experience in preceding periods (he does not use the initial beliefs 
anymore). If a farmer has never experimented with a new variety, but he has received 
information signals from other sources about its traits, he might use the most relevant 
information recently obtained from alternative sources or hold on to his prior beliefs. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973) found that subjects disregard prior probabilities when they have other 
information, even if this information is uninformative or leads to prediction errors. They 
correctly utilized prior probabilities only when no other information was available. However, 
Wells and Harvey (1977) suggest that new and old information might conflict with each other 
and either source of information might be dismissed. When initial beliefs are given priority, 
farmers have been said to be conservative. Which source of information is used in this case could 
be tested empirically in terms of the predictive ability of the model. Since information signals 
from others are less accurate and more abundant, a farmer only stores the most recent ones 
received. Finally, if the farmer has not experimented recently with a specific variety and neither 
have any of the farmers close to him, the farmer has no other source of information than his 
initial belief.  
This rule of thumb description implies that over time agents separate in heterogeneous 
information structure categories. These categories can be summarized in terms of the different 
weighting schemes in Equation (8’’’): 28 
 
 
Category 1:   Σt ρ
^own
1,ijt = 1             if in the last period,  D
own
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1,ijk = 1 if for some period(s) up to t-1,  D
own
ijt = 1  
                                                                 
but in the last period D
own
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others
ijt = 1 
 
Category 3:   Σk=1
t-1 ρ
^own
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own
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own
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others
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Category 4:   ρ
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others
ijt = 1 
 
Category 5:   ρ
^
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own
ijt  = 1  
                                                               
and in the last period D
others
ijt ≠  1 
 
Result 6: Farmers who have grown a new variety every year since its introduction rely on their 
own information only when forming expectations about traits. Farmers who rotate combine their 
previous own experience with the most recent others’ experiences (as available). Farmers who 
have never grown a new variety might use neighbor’s signals, if these are available and do not 
conflict with their initial beliefs. Otherwise, farmers rely exclusively on their initial expectations.  
Thus, decisions among varieties are based on one of the following expected utilities 
corresponding to different information structures. 
For categories 1 and 3:                    
 




ijt + EN [Xj| ∆ it]* ψ j(∆ it ,. ))                              (12) 
 
For category 2: 
 








ijt)+ EN [Xj| ∆ it]* ψ j(∆ it ,. ))     (13) 
 
For category 4a: 
 
EN [Uijt] = -aPijt + b(π j(.)*O
N
jt+ EN [Xj| ∆ it]* π j(∆ it ,. ))                (14) 
 
For categories 4b and 5: 
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EN [Uijt] = -aPijt + b(π j(.)*AN*+ EN [Xj| ∆ it]* π j(∆ it ,. ))               (15) 
 
Defining how far in the past are the weights of the own experience signals given a non-zero 
value and what the relative magnitude of these weights is, precisely depends on whether the 
process is perceived to be stationary or not. Several processes in agriculture which determine 
traits like yield advantage or insecticide-savings exhibit seasonality. As an example, average 
levels of European Corn Borer infestations for the state of Wisconsin are shown to oscillate in 
intervals that peak every three to seven years since 1942 (Lambrecht 2004). Farmers who 
perceive this type of variation are much better off approximating the future level of infestation 
based on the last observed signal than based on an average over all years. Thus, in order to 
determine these weights a researcher should look at the type of process in question. In the same 
vein, recent information from very close neighbors might be a better predictor than old own 
information. 
4.2 Timing of Events in a Specific Period  
A farmer’s current beliefs about the observable local mean traits of a variety j were partitioned 
according to the time of information acquisition. At the beginning of a period, before making 
choices among varieties, a farmer has some prior expectation that is based on observed signals 
up to that time. After the harvest, at the end of the period the farmer observes new information. 
This would correspond to a standard rational Bayesian framework if the farmer did not distrust 
observed information. Before making his variety choice the farmer might reevaluate the prior 
expectation, based on his perception about how unobservable factors might affect outcomes at 
his location. This corresponds to the second term in the expected trait equation presented earlier 
EN (Xj) = EN (Xj| Ii(t))*ψ j({|Ii(t)|1,…, |Ii(t)|J}, ei) + EN [Xj| ∆ i( t)]* ψ j(∆ i( t), ei).  Then, the farmer 
makes his choice and purchases the seed for the chosen variety.  
The timing of the process described above allows for the possibility that farmers do not 
act according to the information provided by the observed sample information. 
Result 7: Choices made based on the maximization of equation (6) do not require the farmer to 
be objectively or subjectively rational, in the sense that a farmer might change the ordering in 
which he had ranked alternative varieties earlier in the same period in a way that contradicts the 
preference ordering revealed by observed data. 30 
 
Proof of Result 7: Let j be a new variety for which EN [Xj| Ii(t)] * ψ j(.) - X
N
k  > 0 , where k is a 
traditional variety with perfectly observed traits. Let  Pijt =Pikt and  
EN [Xj| ∆ it] > (EN [Xj| Ii(t)] * ψ j(.)-X
N
k) /(1-ψ j(.)), then the following two statements hold : 
a) EN[Uijt | Ii(t)] > EN[Uikt | Ii(t)] 
b) EN [Uijt] < EN [Uikt] 
An example of the previous result in the setting of adoption of genetically modified crops is the 
following: a farmer has planted an insect-resistant variety in period t-1. After the harvest he 
receives only good signals about the mean traits of this variety, relative to regular varieties. A 
standard rational Bayesian farmer should act accordingly to what he has observed and continue 
growing the insect-resistant variety. In the present framework, the farmer might have some 
sudden fear regarding potential environmental damage caused by all his plantings and assign a 
very low expected trait value to the GM variety under this hypothetical scenario. Thus, although 
he weights the good news observed scenario higher, the expectation on his nightmare scenario 
might be so highly negative that it might cause him to disadopt and only buy a regular variety in 
the next period.    
4.3 Alternative Decision Rules and Estimation Strategies 
In the technology adoption literature it is standard to assume that decisions are based on a 
classical expected utility criterion using a von Neumann and Morgenstern approach. Underlying 
this concept is the principle that expected utility is computed in terms of a probability measure 
that accurately models future and unobserved trait evolutions. As argued above, however, the 
computation of this expectation measure might be itself subject to uncertainty (ambiguity). 
Below, I present the estimation strategies that correspond to three different decision rules and 
assumptions about the information structure and computational ability of the decision-maker.  
The first strategy presumes that the decision maker can infer the true distribution of the 
outcomes or traits of interest and does not sort available information signals (because all signals 
are considered informative about the local nature of the uncertain process of interest). Thus, this 
strategy is more appropriate for scenarios with experimental conditions and agents with high 
computational ability. This will be identified by the name of full observability case. The second 
is consistent with agents whose observability is limited, who have limited computational ability 
or who sort their information because they consider that the environment faced by farmers 
located in different information regions is fundamentally different to their own. However, these 31 
 
agents must be confident about being able to do accurate predictions of outcomes under 
alternative scenarios (despite their potential reduced information or low computational ability). 
This will be identified by the name of standard boundedly rational case. The third strategy is as 
the second one except for the fact that it allows for the consideration of a full range of expected 
utility values associated with a complicated environment (defined in the introduction). This will 
be identified by the name of ambiguity boundedly rational case. 
4.3.1   Full observability case: the farmer i knows the objective distributions of traits 
(conditional on his information set Ii ), and therefore has an idea about the mean of this 
distribution, E[Xj| Ii(t)],  he solves the problem:  
 
Max j E[Uijt| Ii(t)]   i=1,…,I;   j =1,...,J     (16a) 
 
The researcher solves the problem  
 
Max j ∫ E[Uijt| Ii(t)] dP(e)         (16b) 
 
When the farmer does not have full observability, but only knows that the vector of expected 
mean traits belongs to some set R[E(Xj)], the problem above is not solvable in general.  
4.3.2   Standard Bounded-Rationality Case: the farmer considers himself as a member of a 
reference group Ni that he predicts to have similar production conditions to his own. He then 
solves the limited-information version of the previous model: 
 
Max j EN[Uijt| Ii(t)]               (17) 
 
and the researcher solves the analogous problem as in (16b) 
4.3.3  Ambiguity-Bounded-Rationality Case: a farmer might consider himself as a member of a 
reference group and still think that this reference group does not provide him with enough 
information as to know what he would obtain in his farm when growing a new variety. If this is 
the case then R[EN(Xj)] might contain multiple values. Then, for the researcher to solve the 
problem it is necessary to figure out how the farmer might choose among those values.  32 
 
Manski (2004) has reviewed some  ”reasonable” decision rules in this setting. One is the 
maximin rule, proposed by Wald(1950). This rule is used by decision-makers who are ambiguity 
averse and prefer to make their calculations based on a bad scenario, rather than being optimistic 
and getting disappointed. In the present setting, this amounts to solving the problem: 
Max j Min η∈  R[EN(Xj)] EN[Uijt]                (18) 
 
The farmer thinks of the worst feasible state of the world according to the information in his 
reference group, and makes his choice maximizing his utility given that worst case scenario.  
Another reasonable rule, proposed by Hurwicz (1951) consists of the maximization of a 
weighted average of the minimum and maximum values of the objective function that are 
feasible for each variety: 
Max j Өj*{Min η∈  R[EN(Xj | Ii(t), ∆  i] EN[Uijt]}+(1- Өj)*{Max η∈  R[EN(Xj | Ii(t), ∆  i] EN[Uijt]}        (19) 
 
Өj ∈ [0,1], expressing different degrees of optimism or pessimism. 
 
Unlike the decision rule in equation 19, the one represented by equation 18 has been 
axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and shown to correspond to preferences that 
account for aversion against risk and ambiguity (see also Follmer and Schied 2004; Section 2.5).  
Taking the infimum of all expected utilities (or minimum if the set of expected utilities is 
bounded below) for prior models that describe the beliefs about possible future scenarios 
corresponds to a worst-case approach. This type of preference ordering is increasingly being 
used in analysis of optimal investment decisions (Talay and Zheng 2002, Quenez 2004, Schied 
2004, 2005; Burgert and Ruschendorf  2005, Muller 2005, and Hernandez-Hernandez and Schied 
2006). 
An important feature of the ambiguity-bounded-rationality estimation strategy is that it is 
a generalized form of the standard bounded rationality one. In other words, for some farmers, 
equations 18 and 19 collapse to the decision rule described in equation 17. Recall that the degree 
of ambiguity that a farmer faces determines the size of the sets of expected traits and, 
consequently, of expected utilities. Since this degree varies across farmers --more specifically, it 
decreases as the amount of information signals received by a farmer as well as his computational 
ability increase, or as the local conditions are more homogeneous— for some farmers ψ  j(.) 33 
 
tends to one and this implies that  EN[Uijt]= EN[Uijt| Ii(t)] = Min η∈  R[EN(Xj)] EN[Uijt] = Max η∈  
R[EN(Xj)]. 
19  Thus, the standard bounded rationality estimation strategy is a special case of the 
latter strategy, where all farmers have high confidence in the data observed and predictions 
made, perhaps because their farming conditions are highly homogeneous.  
 
5. Discussion: Implications of the Different Frameworks 
Implementing the model through a Bayesian mechanism presupposes having all the information 
that is necessary to infer all past distributions of outcomes, knowing the true noise of information 
and having excellent computational ability. These assumptions result in an expected utility of the 
type that is valid in a full observability setting --identified with equation 6’-- for all farmers, 
which corresponds to one special case  of R{EN [Uijt]} being a singleton, and where farmers do 
not need to sort available information. Thus, it enables choice through the standard utility 
maximization method described by equation 16a (in Decision Rules section), because the 
objective function is uniquely identified and expectations are not conditional on the information 
that the farmer belongs to an information region.  
In this framework, a marginal change in the number of observations over time and across 
sources unambiguously reduces the prediction error (which can be established from equation 11). 
This is a consequence of the assumption that all information pieces are independent and reduce 
the prediction error by the same amount and regardless of the time when they were observed. 
Thus, as the number of trials observed becomes larger, the uncertainty about Xj tends to zero 
(then, it does not seem surprising that ‘under full observability’ Xj becomes ‘fully observable’). 
The decrease in variance of the prediction error caused by trial observations, in turn, reduces the 
weight assigned to new information. Intuitively, as the technology becomes more popular and 
the experience of the farmer with the new variety increases, there are less unexpected elements 
and the weight that farmers assign to this type of information decreases. These implications seem 
to be more realistic for a technology that is, ex ante, known to bring a higher average utility to 
the farmer population considered. Several studies actually assume the superiority of the new 
                                                 
19  Complete homogeneity of farming conditions is a very unlikely scenario and thus is not considered in detail. It 




j1 in equation 7.; that is, the set of feasible outcomes is single valued; implying that  
Min η∈  R[EN(Xj)] EN[Uijt] = Max η∈  R[EN(Xj)] . Although it does not directly imply EN[Uijt]= EN[Uijt| Ii(t)], I assume that 




j1 or π  j(.)=1. In both cases, EN[Uijt]= EN[Uijt| Ii(t)] 
holds. 34 
 
variety as a technological characteristic (Foster and Rosenzweig, Isik and Khanna 2003). 
However, if a new technology is characterized by its traits and these are perceived differently by 
each individual, the average level of utility resulting from the adoption of this technology is itself 
an empirical question. In fact it is often the relevant question in the case of new technologies. 
In this standard approach, the stationarity characteristic of the trait distribution is what 
enables the farmer to learn about his own trait distributions by observing past experiences. 
20  
Thus, not only can learning occur very fast, but it is easy (because mean and variance of the 
process are constant over time and across locations). Even if the farmer is assumed to receive 
information signals from a limited group of people (reference group or neighbors), most 
applications using Bayesian learning assume that all farmers care about knowing the same 
average trait level (Xj) rather than about a local level (Xj
N). This assumption, as explained earlier, 
is related to the underlying stationarity of the process. If this unique mean for a variety j  is 
higher than the mean for another variety k, given that the prediction error of farmers reduces over 
time as more information is available (although potentially enhancing optimization performance 
for the econometrician), this results in a quick loss of diversity in the chosen alternatives in the 
population and generalized adoption of the highest mean payoff variety.  
As a result, lack of adoption, transfer or disadoption of new technologies is hardly 
explained under the assumptions of the model.  And, depending on the type of information 
collected, this approach can create selection bias, if the analysis relies only on adopters; and 
specification bias, if the study deals with individuals who have used the technology some time 
but the model does not allow for disadoption. In fact, many studies that have adopted the 
Bayesian framework seeking to explain adoption in a country have used samples including only 
in the regions where adopters are to be found (Besley and Case, Foster and Rosenzweig, 
Cameron 1998, Munshi 2004). Another reason related is that the model has little ability to 
explain why a farmer who has no experience with a new variety, and who has no neighbors 
growing this variety, would adopt it. In fact, the expected traits of new technologies for 
individuals living in regions where little or no adoption has yet taken place are almost arbitrarily 
determined by the initial belief structure assumed. In many applications this initial condition is 
just constant across individuals or takes the form of a uniform –uninformative- prior. And 
including these individuals as part of the study results in a loss of explanatory power, at best, or 
                                                 
20 See Manski 2004 for a different framework using the same assumptions and with similar implications. 35 
 
in a more serious estimation problem if the number of adopters is very small (e.g. in the initial 
phases of introduction of a technology). This problem is analogous to the problem of finding an 
adequate ’reservation utility’ level for non-adopters, and has been addressed by labor economists 
through search models and by sociologists through the concept of heterogeneous “adoption 
thresholds”. 
21  
In contrast to the standard Bayesian assumptions, the alternative approach assumes that 
farmers cannot observe the full distribution of traits and they think that it is difficult to infer it 
from the observed data. Their lack of confidence on the observed data or on their ability to 
process it and their uncertainty about a measure of expected utility associated with unobservable 
factors leads them to use a choice criterion that differs from standard utility maximization 
(Equation 18). However, the degree of confidence differs across agents and the choice criterion 
resembles the standard utility maximization for farmers with high confidence (Result 1.a). In this 
case, the choice criterion in equation 18 collapses to the one in equation 17.  
Because of the farmers’ perception that it is difficult to infer the full trait distribution, 
they try to approximate the mean of the local distribution of traits by sorting out the information 
received. Since the full structure of information noise is not known by farmers, they sort out their 
data relying on a representativeness or similarity criterion, in each specific period. While 
standard frameworks see the neighborhood size as an informational constraint that limits learning 
and adoption, the alternative approach also emphasizes the ability to sort and combine 
information (Results 4) as a limitation. It is farmers in “regions” with low adopter rates, who 
have not grown the variety under consideration recently (Result 6) and whose location is closest 
to the average adopter location who benefit the most from information access (because observed 
information is most precise for them). Farmers who have no own experience growing a new 
variety might see their confidence increased because they see more people growing the variety in 
a specific period. If they are ambiguity averse, this might lead them to adopt the variety. 
However, it is the own experience in the next period which will determine whether the farmer 
will continue growing the variety or disadopt. In general, choices by farmers are influenced by 
the popularity of a variety under consideration, as in the standard framework; however, here they 
are also influenced by the popularity of similar varieties. As shown in chapter 1, a trait-based 
                                                 
21 In the model above, these thresholds vary across individuals according to the performance of traditional varieties 
in their location. 
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framework facilitates the analysis of multiple related varieties and as derived in this chapter, it 
captures the possibility of disadoption or transfer to a similar variety (Result 2).  
Computational ability is different across farmers and it influences negatively the degree 
of unmeasurable uncertainty that a farmer faces. Thus, for farmers with a constant over time low 
computational ability, the prediction uncertainty (defined in this setting as the difference between 
mean expectation and true mean trait level in the location) might never be zero, even if they 
observe an infinite number of observations. In fact, as the confidence of a farmer increases, the 
ambiguity faced by him decreases, but this does not imply that his beliefs converge to the true 
local mean of the process. In terms of the model, a farmer’s approximation of the mean trait, 
EN[Xj] , does not necessarily converge to the true Xj
N. If this convergence implies learning, then 
learning in the model depends on whether the process is stationary or not.   
To clarify things, there are two main types of convergence here (for a given location). 
One is the one just mentioned (EN[Xj] to the true Xj
N), and which implies learning over time 
about the true local mean outcome, by farmers in a specific location. The second is the 
convergence of EN [Xj| Ii(t)] towards EN[Xj] and represents maximum reduction of ambiguity over 
time and across farmers.  
The first type of convergence – learning - in a scenario with ambiguity, can be seen as a 
sequential reduction of this type of uncertainty, as Manski (2004) has shown. He proposed a 
model of social learning under ambiguity, showing that assuming stationarity of the process of 
interest, ambiguity would lead to lack of convergence to the true mean. In particular, if agents 
are pessimistic, the adoption rate of an innovation increases with time and converges to a steady 
state that is below the optimal adoption rate. On the contrary, if agents are optimistic, the 
adoption rate starts at a high level, decreases with time and falls to a steady state that is above the 
optimal rate of adoption. However, Manski does not consider learning-by-doing in his model, 
which is a highly unbiased source of information for agricultural scenarios. The effect of this 
type of information will likely cause convergence to occur closer to the true mean than in 
Manski’s scenario. However, achieving a steady state highly depends on the stationarity 
assumption.  
In highly non-stationary environments learning is more difficult because -- as Suppes 
(1994) puts it when referring to non-stationary environments-- “in the worst kind of environment 
no significant event has a high probability”. Thus, it is difficult to identify any regularity in 37 
 
outcomes over time in order to make any accurate prediction. One can think of stationarity as 
increasing information representativeness in an intertemporal sense; when the trait process is 
stationary, data originated in every period is representative of the whole trait process and the best 
estimator is an average over time of the stored data.. If the process is non-stationary, a farmer 
might be best considering only recent information. In this case, traits are perceived as changing 
constantly, and only agents who have an a priori knowledge of the way in which these changes 
vary can learn about the traits of a technology by tracking the data generating process over time 
(As noted by Epstein 2006 (P.19), this is what happens in regime switching models with 
persistent hidden state variables). However, learning never ceases because agents are always at 
least one step behind. 
Convergence of expectations across locations depends on heterogeneity as well. 
Homogeneity across locations means that there are less and wider information regions and that 
information is more representative of every individual farmer randomly selected from the 
population. Thus it amounts to having more information. High heterogeneity across locations 
implies more fractured information regions and slower convergence. 
For ambiguity-averse individuals, reductions in ambiguity or unmeasurable uncertainty 
with respect to one variety increase the adoption probability. As results 1a) and b) imply, 
ambiguity decreases as computational ability, own experimentation and popularity increase, and 
is lower for individuals living in more homogeneous regions (Homogeneity of farming 
conditions not only reduces the local spread of outcomes but also translates into more 
information representativeness and more similarity of the varieties grown and, therefore, in 
increased available information for individual farmers and consequent ambiguity reductions). 
However, if unobservable conditions and complexity persist over time, farmers might never be 
completely confident that the observed data will yield good predictions (the process is never 
perceived as being stationary and signals are never perceived as being iid). Thus, at the 
population level there might be a point where no further ambiguity reduction is possible even if 
access to information is complete. Although information costs are not directly incorporated in the 
model, costly acquisition of computational ability would translate into lower computational 
ability and a higher degree of ambiguity. 
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6. Concluding Remarks  
Key assumptions maintained in technology adoption studies using standard Bayesian learning 
mechanisms are found to be more appropriate for experimental settings than for agriculture. 
These identified assumptions are: First, the true distribution of relevant variables such as traits 
and information signals is assumed to be fully observable. Second, information signals (about 
trials) are independently and identically distributed (and so are they perceived by farmers). The 
noise of these signals is assumed to be common to and known by the farmers. Thus, farmers can 
be (and are) sure about the connection between these signals and the true parameters of the fully 
observable trait distribution. Third, decision-makers have infinite memory, enormous 
computational capacity (they use large sets of trial data and complicated optimization algorithms 
to make decisions) and have great ambitions about what they can learn and observe (they have 
no doubt that beliefs converge to the truth). Fourth, the unknown factors to be learned about 
(parameters of the trait distribution) do not change over time or across locations (learning is 
easy!). These assumptions determine that farmers get to completely characterize the true mean 
traits of a technology over time.  
However, there exist several reasons why agents choosing among various agricultural 
technologies are not likely to fully observe trait distributions or rely on data intensive and 
mathematically complicated optimization algorithms; implying that learning (from past 
experiences and from others) is more difficult in agricultural settings than it would be in 
laboratory type scenarios. Therefore, standard approaches create biases in estimations because of 
their informational assumptions. In particular, one main source of measurement bias arises 
because the farmer does not estimate a mean trait based on all observed signals, but rather cares 
about the quality of these data (in terms of the information that they convey regarding potential 
outcomes on his own farm) and sorts out the information he receives before processing it.  
A second source of measurement bias is related to the perception of the farmer that the 
data he has observed in his location are not a random sample. That is, that information signals 
are not based on trials that are representative of the whole population in his information region. 
The bias related to this source increases as farmers' computational ability and experience with 
closely related varieties decreases. It is also high for farmers whose farming conditions differ 
mostly from the conditions of early technology adopters. 39 
 
A technology adoption model that neither relies on full observability of trait probability 
distributions nor iid-ness of information signals has been proposed. The required assumptions are 
that farmers use heuristic rules to decide between data sources and a notion of data 
representativeness to sort information. Farmers sorting of information separates the population in 
heterogeneous groups that differ in their information structures and defines different adoption 
determinants across groups. The model allows for farmers to be unsure about the reliability of 
data and about their ability to make predictions based on these data, leading them to not only sort 
information signals but to potentially face a type of uncertainty that is termed ambiguity. The 
complex nature of the environment, the lack of confidence and the uncertainty faced by farmers 
influences their behavior and might lead them to never cease learning.  
Two alternative estimation approaches to the standard rational expectations optimization 
framework are proposed. One is based on standard bounded-rationality considerations and 
involves maximizing a local expectation determined by the information region of the farmer. The 
second is grounded on a combination of ambiguity and bounded-rationality, which represents a 
generalization of the former. These estimation strategies will be applied in the next chapter of 
this dissertation. The econometric model used for this application will be the genetically-
modified trait based adoption model developed in the first chapter of the dissertation. This will 
provide a means to see how the different strategies perform, and how sensitive the estimation 
results in chapter one are to alternative formulations of the problem that were developed in this 
second chapter.  
Finally, the model developed in this article is not seen to be relevant only for applications 
related to adoption of innovations as the one presented. It relates to any setting were decision-
makers might be uncertain about the consequences of their acts or attributes of their choice 
alternatives, and do not feel confident in assessing probability distributions of these 
consequences or attributes.  As an example, studies seeking to perform hypothetical valuation of 
goods can be seen as sharing such a setting. These studies are widely criticized because of the 
potential uncertainty faced by respondents when they are asked to make choices. Studies which 
have dealt with this uncertainty take the view that some respondents are unsure what their 
behavior would be in an actual scenario (See Moore 2006, referring to willingness-to-pay 
behavior). This article proposes that the uncertainty is not related to uncertainty regarding how to 40 
 
behave, but rather, is due to lack of or unobservability of information determining the true 
obtained traits in the actual scenario.  
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